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- abstract - 
 
Many people within the movement of 
movements, while outraged at the global state 
of affairs, and determined to bring about 
large-scale systemic change, are nevertheless 
reluctant to use the language of winning - that 
is, to consider what it means to bring about 
that change against determined and powerful 
opposition. In part this reflects a fear that to 
think strategically is to act like "the system", 
and is bound to lead to cynical 
instrumentalism and the attempt to replace 
one elite-led system with another.  
We start by outlining what is at stake and 
asking what "winning" means: what actually 
happens when a social movement project from 
below achieves its goal of constructing 
"another world"? We explore the step- by-step 
processes through which the movement of 
movements is currently developing the 
"insurgent architecture" involved in this 
construction, and noting how this presents a 
challenge for the powers that be. 
We then turn to the massive opposition that 
the movement has been meeting from above - 
from multinational institutions, states and 
corporations. We explore the nature of these 
responses and argue that while they have 
failed to defeat the movement, they have 
brought about something of a temporary 
stalemate. We ask how the movement can get 
beyond this stalemate, not by adopting the 
logic and methods of its opponents, but by 
taking qualitative steps forward in its own 
development, according to its own logic.  
The paper finishes with some brief discussion 
of the most important practical steps in 
constructing another world, and the nature of 
the moments of confrontation that lie ahead. 
 
 
This is a working draft, for whose 
failings Laurence takes full 
responsibility. Please do not quote too 
loudly!  
 
Introduction 
This paper is part of Alf and Laurence’s 
project to rethink social movement theory in 
a way that might be useful to contemporary 
movements, and in particular to the 
movement against neo-liberal capitalism. We 
started work on this project because of our 
own experience of movements in Ireland, 
India and Norway, their struggles to develop 
better understandings of their practice and 
the difficulties they face in doing this. In this 
paper we want to ask a fairly simple 
question: what should the movement of 
movements do if we want to win?  
Obviously there are many answers out there, 
and different answers tend to convince 
different people for a range of reasons: 
relevance to their specific struggles, ability to 
answer immediate questions, ideological 
affinities, language and sheer style are 
obviously part of the package, and what we 
have to say will be judged in these terms. We 
think there are two related reasons why our 
approach may have something to offer 
beyond these. 
One is that it draws on the experience of 
previous generations of activists in 
movements which had at least some success 
in confronting and changing existing power 
relations on a broad scale. In other words, 
rather than borrowing from academic theory 
(which is often second-hand activist theory 
minus the good parts) or making up 
something completely new, we feel that 
activist theorising has real value, because of 
its orientation to “this-worldly” practice. 
While our main shared point of reference is 
the workers’ movement and Marxist theories, 
we are also drawing on the experiences of 
women’s movements, of national 
independence movements in the majority 
world and of the movements of 1968 and 
their successors. No one movement or 
tradition has a monopoly on popular 
struggles for change, or on what people have 
learnt in the process. 
The other reason is horizontal in time: we 
feel that it makes more sense to rely on the 
combining and reflecting of the experience 
and reflection of many different elements of 
the movement, rather than to pull a rabbit 
out of a hat based on the processes of a 
small movement elite – whether the 
accommodation processes of NGOs, the 
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possession of theoretically correct knowledge 
on the part of political sects, or the 
radicalisation of stylised violence on the part 
of young men. As Hilary Wainwright (1994) 
has put it, we are talking about a 
“democratic epistemology” in which the most 
valid source of knowledge about what 
movements need to do is the shared 
experience gathered by their different 
participants, distilled and developed in their 
internal debates. 
So in this workshop as a whole, but also in 
this paper, we are trying to draw on as broad 
a range of what we (activists) already know 
as possible, in order to make sense of what 
we should do next – and broaden that out in 
the discussion to bring in the knowledge of 
other participants. First, though, if we raise 
the question “how can we win?” we have to 
deal with people who feel that talking about 
winning is missing the point. 
 
What does it mean for a movement from 
below to win? 
Many people within the movement of 
movements, although they are outraged at 
the global state of affairs, and determined to 
bring about large-scale systemic change, are 
reluctant to use the language of winning – in 
other words, to consider what it means to 
bring about that change against determined 
and powerful opposition.  
In part this reflects a fear that to think in 
these terms is to act like “the system”, and is 
bound to lead to cynical instrumentalism 
and the attempt to replace one elite-led 
system with another. So we need to outline 
what is at stake and ask what “winning” 
means. What actually happens when a social 
movement project from below achieves its 
goal of constructing “another world”?  
 
The fear of Leninism 
One concern can best be described as the 
“fear of Leninism”: the assumption that 
winning implies a military insurrection 
whose outcome will inevitably be an 
authoritarian state. In some ways this 
misrepresents what actually happened in 
October 1917, but that is another story: the 
issue here is the myth of 1917.  
One way of responding to this myth is with 
another myth, or at least a factoid: that more 
people were killed in making Eisenstein’s 
movie about the storming of the Winter 
Palace than in the real thing. While we have 
not been able to verify this, the general sense 
is true: the insurrection, like most successful 
insurrections, was a relatively mild event 
(and paled into insignificance by comparison 
with what was going on in the rest of Europe 
at the same time). 
More generally, it is true to say that violence 
has almost always been the preserve not of 
revolutionary movements1 but of states: 
whether states engaged in fighting major 
wars and repressing revolution, or post-
revolutionary states repressing internal 
dissent and fighting external enemies 
(Halperin). Thus in the three major waves of 
20th century revolutions in Europe (1916 – 
23, 1943 – 47, 1965 – 70) by far the most 
violent were those of the European 
Resistance in countries such as France, 
Italy, Poland and Yugoslavia. These levels of 
violence were not only dwarfed by the more 
general violence of the war; they were to a 
large extent made possible by Allied 
assistance and understood as part of the war 
effort. 
There is a simple reason for this 
peacefulness of actual revolutions, which is 
that under normal circumstances, ordinary 
people are generally reluctant to engage in 
systematic violence, and it is in fact a serious 
practical problem for armies to retrain them 
so that they are willing to kill on command. 
It is rare, in other words, for popular 
movements to be in any position to commit 
the kinds of mass killing that states can 
manage with a wave of the hand; and (we 
might add) it has been less and less relevant 
to the question of political power since 
Engels first noted the fact in the 1890s: 
power (for movements from below, at least) 
rarely comes out of the barrel of a gun. 
A related, but more practical, kind of concern 
can be called the “fear of Thermidor”: the fear 
that after the rolling-back of a partially 
successful revolution, or the defeat of an 
unsuccessful one, will come a counter-
revolutionary bloodbath aimed at terrorising 
the population into submission. Such 
bloodbaths are unfortunately all too 
frequent, as the examples of the Paris 
Commune, fascism in power in Europe, or 
the Latin American “dirty wars” of the 1970s 
and 1980s remind us.  
                                       
1 There is one major exception to this, which is 
conspiratorial, “substitutionist” groups. Some 
historical examples include the Blanquist 
tradition in France, the 1916 Rising in Ireland 
and the RAF in Germany. Nevertheless, even these 
conspirators were models of peacefulness 
compared to their opponents. 
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We draw a slightly different lesson from these 
experiences, which is that if we create 
movements which pose a serious threat to 
those in power we had better be serious 
about winning, because the costs of only 
getting halfway (scaring them, or winning but 
only temporarily) are often too horrifying to 
be contemplated. Saying “another world is 
possible” but planning to leave those in 
power, in power, risks the lives not only of 
activists, but of anyone who might be seen to 
be supporting them. 
 
Refusals to win 
Another kind of problem can best be 
described as “refusals to win”. One kind of 
refusal to win is the attempt to replace one 
elite with another (or, even more narrowly, 
one policy with another) within the 
institutions of the transnational state (see 
Cammack on the World Bank, for example), 
whether because it is seen as genuinely a 
step forward or because it is seen as the only 
game in town. This is in essence the 
reformist strategy associated with the 
“insider critics” of the WTO, World Bank, G8 
etc. – whether NGOs, defectors such as 
Sachs and Soros, or celebrities such as Bono 
and Bob Geldof. Its starting assumption is 
TINA – “There is no alternative”, only mild 
improvements on the basic facts of neo-
liberalism, as though those fell from the sky. 
Another is “decoupling” strategies which are 
“against globalisation” but broadly in favour 
of locally existing power structures, although 
these naturally have to be modified to some 
extent. This strategy runs from LETS 
schemes through to nationalism and 
religious fundamentalism; Amory Starr used 
to argue in favour of these approaches, but 
seems to have changed her mind more 
recently. 
In some ways these are at least honest in 
their limited aims. We doubt their feasibility 
– of reformism because neo-liberalism has so 
little to offer, of pure localism because it 
deconstructs its own ability to resist. More 
serious issues are raised by the strategy of 
“change the world without taking power”. 
There are two readings of this: one, which we 
take to be Holloway’s own, that the primary 
power relations, and hence the primary 
terrain where struggles need to win, is social 
rather than political; it is possible to broadly 
agree with this without ignoring the need for 
a political victory on the back of a social one 
(which in essence is the strategy proposed by 
Gramsci for western Europe). 
The more damaging reading treats the state 
as either irrelevant or as simply given, and is 
deliberately feeble in its aspirations. We 
relate this approach, and the celebration by 
many liberals of “civil society”2, to the post-
1968 settlement in which it was accepted 
that the power of the state could not be 
challenged, because ultimately it was backed 
up by tanks (as was demonstrated variously 
in Prague, Paris and Derry). The theoretical 
basis of this celebration of defeat (because 
that is what is at stake) was overturned in 
1989, when it was demonstrated that power 
does not always come out of the barrel of a 
gun – or more specifically, that military 
power ultimately rests on political and social 
power. 
 
So what does winning mean? 
This section is about “what revolutions look 
like”, given our general understanding of the 
process of social movements as one of the 
widening and deepening of the scope and 
direction of collective skilled activity. In this 
perspective, winning consists of society 
defeating the state, breaking up at least 
some of the existing power relations, and 
starting to create and substitute its own, 
democratically-controlled, institutions in 
place of the old ones3. Some such 
experiences – the French Revolution of 1789, 
the Paris Commune of 1871, the “two red 
years” in Italy, the Spanish Revolution, the 
institutions of the European Resistance in 
1943 – 45, the dissident agenda of 1956 in 
Hungary and 1968 in Prague, the “utopian 
moment” of the 1960s in advanced capitalist 
countries, the Zapatista movement in 
southeast Mexico – are well known, others 
less so. 
                                       
2 Obviously there are other, and more useful, 
meanings of “civil society”, starting with that used 
by Gramsci. 
3 In another historical period, the phrase 
“dictatorship of the proletariat” was used to define 
this – in ancient Rome (and before Mussolini) a 
“dictator” was someone to whom power was given 
for a limited period of time to act outside 
constitutional limits. In other words, the 
“dictatorship of the proletariat” consisted, in cases 
such as the Paris Commune, of ordinary people 
(the proletariat being those who had nothing but 
their children) directly taking power, outside the 
legal bounds set by a collapsed regime, while they 
put a new kind of social order in place. Obviously 
in the 20th century the phrase has come to have 
very different connotations, and we are not 
suggesting reviving it. 
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Revolution, then, is not an “imposition” 
coming from a vanguard elite, but a collective 
“achievement” of ordinary people going far 
beyond what they previously believed to be 
possible. What these experiences have in 
common is a situation where human self-
development (not in an isolated, consumerist 
sense but including development of social 
relations) is able to flourish beyond the 
normal limits set by exploitative and 
oppressive social relations, leading to 
institutions driven by human need rather 
than by profit and power. In turn, this tends 
to give rise to self-management in workplaces 
and direct democracy in communities, while 
on a wider scale it has historically always 
been connected with a strong 
internationalism, a refusal of racism and 
advances in women’s power.  
This process does not come from nowhere. 
As Michael Lebowits has argued, the 
“political economy of labour” – the way in 
which ordinary people try to meet their needs 
in the face of capital and the state – is 
something which people are constantly 
struggling towards, albeit most of the time in 
a less dramatic way. In “revolutionary 
moments” people see, and seize, the 
opportunity to push things further – but 
what they are doing comes out of this 
broader, everyday struggle. 
This is sometimes talked about in terms of 
“organic crisis”. We want to stress, as 
Cleaver does, that such crises are not the 
outcomes of the mysterious workings of the 
objective laws of capital, but rather are the 
result of working class struggle against 
capital. The issue is not one of astrology – 
the correct alignment of objective conditions 
and subjective perceptions, but “untimely 
events” as Bensaid has it. 
Rather than try to brand these revolutionary 
experiences for any political party, we would 
argue that these core elements are not the 
exclusive property of any organisation, but 
are part of the core aspirations which 
ordinary people consistently express 
whenever they feel they have a real chance to 
do so. These “everyday utopias” do not need 
to be installed from above by executive fiat; 
what they do entail is a breaking of the 
power relations within workplaces, state 
institutions, local communities and globally 
which stand in their way.  
Not coincidentally, these transformations 
(and the personal transformations which 
those involved consistently report) are part 
and parcel of the process of developing 
movements from below which challenge 
existing power relations (as Sewell has 
argued, for example, revolution in the 
modern sense was invented at the Bastille). 
In other words, it is by standing up to power 
that people can develop real alternatives – 
not by accepting authoritarian power 
relations in the things that really matter and 
trying to win small battles within the “margin 
of error”, and not by giving up in advance. 
Winning, then, is about human development 
in many dimensions: in changing social 
relations on a micro-scale, in creating new 
ways of working, living in places, of gender 
relations, in constructing broader global 
connections – and in constructing 
movements which can carry this change 
forward against determined, even “last-ditch” 
opposition, even “last-ditch” opposition 
armed with tanks. This is difficult, and 
success is not guaranteed.  
But it is also not impossible. Charles Tilly 
has calculated that Europe, for example, 
experienced roughly one revolutionary 
situation a year over the last half-
millennium. Put another way, in the 
twentieth century most people in most 
countries could expect to experience on 
average one revolutionary moment in their 
lifetimes, even if most were either defeated or 
recuperated by new states. It is possible to 
win, in other words; people try to do so with 
some regularity; and this experience – of 
ordinary people reshaping their world in the 
face of state opposition – is one which our 
movements have to reclaim as theirs. 
 
Building movements:  
the process of insurgent architecture 
Revolution, then, is a development of the 
collective skilled activity of ordinary people to 
the point where it can successfully challenge 
power structures. David Harvey has used the 
metaphor of “insurgent architecture” to 
describe this process of human development 
against opposition, and we want briefly to 
identify the elements contained within this, 
using the experience of the Irish anti-
capitalist movement as a way of identifying 
the issues involved and reframing some of 
the problems facing the movement such as 
institution-building and strategic thinking. 
We next explore the step-by-step processes 
through which the movement of movements 
is currently developing the “insurgent 
architecture” involved in this “political 
economy of labour”, and noting how this 
presents a challenge for the powers that be. 
In this section we use the experience of the 
Irish anti-capitalist movement to look at the 
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process of insurgent architecture in practice, 
and reframe some of the problems facing the 
movement such as institution-building and 
strategic thinking. 
While the movement of movements 
represents the achievement of globalising 
existing resistance, the next step is to 
localise that and “bring it home” to where it 
started. While the struggle against global 
neoliberalism is a universal one, it will be 
fought in particular ways in particular 
places. To quote Neil Smith, “it’s all good and 
well that $500 million can be whizzed around 
the world at the push of a button, but it has 
to come from somewhere and be on its way 
to somewhere” – and so with resistance. 
Irish examples 
One element which needs to be mentioned is 
the long history of urban and rural 
community-based struggles against capitalist 
globalisation in Ireland since the 1960s, 
giving rise to a level of popular organisation 
which has more in common with the majority 
world, or with ethnic minorities in the 
minority world, than it does with dominant 
minorities. In the 1970s and early 1980s, 
such struggles often articulated shared 
identities and ideologies, while engaging in 
very disparate struggles which only 
occasionally reached greater levels of 
organisation. In the late 1980s and 1990s, 
the development of neo-corporatist 
“partnership” led to the institutionalisation 
and fragmentation of these movements. This 
period is now coming to an end under the 
pressure of neo-liberal restructuring from 
above, giving rise to an upsurge in direct 
action such as the experiences chronicled 
and critiqued by Tracey and Terry in their 
paper. 
Secondly, we have seen the development of 
an explicitly anti-capitalist and 
alterglobalisation movement (more or less 
since Genoa), focussing on network-building, 
summit protests, movement media and social 
forum processes. The relationships between 
this movement and community-based 
struggles have been not so much fraught as 
tenuous: around individual conflicts, such as 
opposition to the Shell pipeline at Rossport 
or to the incinerator at Ringaskiddy, 
solidarity and cooperation has been good; 
more generally, attempts by activists from 
either side to build links on a wider scale 
have tended to run into the sand.  
The net result of these two processes in 
Ireland is a paradoxical situation where 
(unlike most other northern states) the anti-
capitalist movement exists against a 
background of far wider and longer-standing 
community organisation; but also where 
(unlike majority world societies) that 
community organisation has little organic 
relationship with the movement.  
The key reason for this distance is 
undoubtedly the successful integration of 
community movements within the 
developmental state, and it is the breakdown 
of developmentalism under the pressures of 
neo-liberal restructuring that makes a 
connection now both thinkable and – at least 
in isolated instances – practical. 
But activists themselves have choices to 
make in this context. It is perfectly possible 
that these connections will be closed off, if 
community organisations pursue defensive 
and particularist strategies in the face of 
seemingly inevitable change; if individual 
movements seeking to “mainstream” their 
issues distance themselves from others 
whose proximity might threaten their 
acceptability to elites; and if activists in the 
anti-capitalist movement are unable to reach 
beyond the reproduction of subcultures of 
educated youth.  
 
Developing strategic thinking 
Strategic thinking, in other words, is tied 
into particular kinds of institution-building: 
both within individual campaigns and 
movements and between them. The 
“insurgent architecture” of the movement of 
movements operates on a particular terrain, 
in which global processes of neo-liberalism 
from above are provoking a revival of 
movements from below. Yet the different 
vernacular styles of building – existing 
institutions, traditions of struggle, and local 
truce lines with the powerful – cannot be 
wished away, only remade in the process of 
attempting to find solidarity with one another 
and win against what is still, for now, a more 
powerful opponent.  
We feel that it is important to hold both 
aspects - the broad social picture and the 
narrower organisational situation – in view 
simultaneously. If we only look at the 
problem in global social terms, we lose a 
sense of how the movement of movements is 
rooted in existing struggles. If we only look at 
those groups which are already mobilised, we 
lose a sense of the movement’s commitment 
to broadening participation – not simply 
numerically, but in terms of power. This 
process implies the movement remaking 
itself, or constantly dying and being reborn: 
a serious challenge to individuals and groups 
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who have only just staked out positions for 
themselves within the movement. 
Strategic questions are always easiest to 
pose in abstract terms, constructing an 
unhelpful relationship between “objective 
reality” and organisational action (“the 
movement must…”). Instead, the logic of our 
argument is to do what we can, and 
encourage others to do what they can, to 
support the process of radicalisation of the 
“movement within society” (which is what 
“social movement” originally meant) – 
supporting what are as yet less articulated, 
less “radical”, or less “organised” layers of 
conflict, reaching out to what people are 
already doing in broader social groups than 
those we can currently connect with, and 
always listening. 
The history of the genesis of the Zapatistas – 
urban radicals seeking to rouse the 
peasantry, finding that indigenous 
communities had been resisting capitalism 
and imperialism for the past 500 years, and 
starting to listen to and learn from them 
before proposing processes through which 
this resistance could develop further – is one 
which the “movement of movements” can still 
learn a lot from in this context.  
Bringing the movement home consists in 
learning from each other, not just tactically 
but also strategically, in constant interaction 
with our own developing practical sense of 
the local situation and its possibilities. We 
need to construct, almost within ourselves 
and our movements, a dialogue between 
these two touchstones, not privilege one over 
the other. 
 
The stalemate 
While the movement is constructing its 
insurgent architecture, this insurgency 
causes a lot of upset to a lot of powerful 
people, and draws down some massive 
opposition from above – from multinational 
institutions, states and corporations, as well 
as from the routines of everyday life and the 
institutional separations within which most 
people necessarily live their lives.  
Elsewhere we have attempted to categorise 
some of the different forms this opposition 
has taken: accommodative responses such 
as co-option and the commodification of 
revolt (which NGOs, the reformist left and a 
variety of individual carpetbaggers have 
colluded with in their own ways) and 
repressive responses such as the 
militarization of policing internally and 
external pressure on “rebel states”.  
While these responses have undoubtedly 
been damaging, they have as yet failed to 
defeat the movement, which is in itself a 
remarkable fact when seen historically. Dual-
power situations have rarely been able to 
sustain themselves over such a period of 
time, and rarely have movements from below 
been able to resist the drive to war. 
Nevertheless, these responses from above 
have created something of a temporary 
stalemate or “phony war”: while its casualties 
are real, we are neither in a revolutionary 
situation nor in one of military repression.  
An obvious historical point of reference for 
this is the experience of 1968. In different 
ways, in Prague, Paris and Derry, limits were 
set on both sides to the escalation of violence 
– which is not, of course, to say that these 
were non-violent situations, simply that the 
use of violence was limited by the broader 
political situation. In Paris, police and 
movement organisers communicated with 
one another to ensure that violence was kept 
within bounds, and the only deaths occurred 
after May itself. In Prague, the memory of the 
Hungarian repression of 1956 limited 
popular response to the Soviet tanks, and 
the purge which followed the invasion was 
itself restrained by comparison with earlier 
periods. In Derry, both the declaration of 
“Free Derry” and Operation Motorman, which 
closed it down, were primarily symbolic – as 
the contrast with the establishment and 
defeat of the Paris Commune makes clear. 
In such situations, to paraphrase Lenin, the 
movement from above cannot gain 
consensus, nor does the movement from 
below have a strategy for moving forward; 
and the restriction on physical violence 
reflects this situation. Although the 
experience of the movement in the South is 
considerably more violent, on any historical 
scale it is mild indeed (consider the contrast 
with the recent civil war in Algeria, or the 
experience of Argentina, Chile, El Salvador or 
Guatemala in the 1970s and 1980s). 
The movement from above cannot gain 
consensus, because neoliberalism 
undermines both the main practical means 
which Fordist capitalism used to build 
alliances, developmental redistribution (as 
Sara and Alf’s paper has pointed out) and its 
main ideological means of doing so, 
nationalism. The movement from below does 
not as yet have a strategy for moving 
forward, in large part because it is not yet 
strong enough to do so, and the danger lies 
here. 
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It is in the nature of movements to move: 
participation is a process of mobilisation and 
radicalisation. States and corporations are 
more likely to be able to sustain a period of 
phony war over time, as they form new layers 
of institutions dedicated to dealing with 
dissent and incorporate it into their work 
routines (Gitlin; Piven and Cloward). In the 
medium term, if the movement cannot 
develop strategies for getting beyond the 
phony war, it will disintegrate, with elements 
returning to a path of institutionalisation 
and integration within existing power 
structures, elements retreating to a process 
of commercialising cultural and lifestyle 
elements, and elements marginalised 
through criminalisation. This is in essence 
the experience of 1968. 
To get beyond the stalemate, of course, the 
movement would have to remake itself in a 
form which would make winning a real 
possibility, and we now turn to this 
problematic. 
 
Beyond the stalemate: how can the 
movement develop? 
We ask how the movement can get beyond 
this stalemate, not by adopting the logic and 
methods of its opponents, but by taking 
qualitative steps forward in its own 
development, according to its own logic. 
Winning, in the terms outlined at the start of 
this paper, is not a result of elite strategies or 
of epic moments of confrontation; it is above 
all a result of the broadening and deepening 
of struggle throughout society.  
The role of the (existing) movement 
institutions in this context is one of 
coordination and communication, education 
and encouragement, taking initiatives and 
confronting the system – but not of 
substituting itself for everyone else. Hence 
we suggest that the best strategy for the 
movement is a further development of the 
“political economy of labour” – the everyday 
struggles of ordinary people for self-
development, to secure access to the 
resources they need to do so, and to create 
the organisations they need for this purpose. 
 
Dual-power situations 
The challenge, then, it how we can build dual 
power situations in the age of global 
neoliberal capitalism. The dual-power 
situations in Chiapas and Argentina 
highlight some what this means in practice. 
In Chiapas, an “armed community”, rather 
than a “people’s army”, has been able to 
create and defend its own territory for the 
past 11 years despite the best efforts both of 
the Mexican state and its US advisors. We do 
not want to romanticise the Zapatistas, and 
we note that strategies of broadening the 
movement to include other elements of 
Mexican society as well as global solidarity 
have always been fundamental to Zapatista 
thinking. But the strength of the Zapatistas 
is clearly in the rooting of Zapatista 
institutions in a “whole way of struggle”. 
In Argentina, the processes of resistance do 
not draw on such homogenous communities, 
and are correspondingly diverse. The 
complexities of the movement’s interaction 
with the Argentinian state also represent a 
very different kind of problem. Yet here again 
the strength of the movements is in their 
grounding in social struggles which go 
deeper than formal organisation, and here 
again a dual-power situation, albeit of a 
different kind, is represented by the road 
blockades, the neighbourhood assemblies 
and the occupied factories. 
The strength of these movements, and their 
remarkable ability to sustain dual-power 
situations over periods of years (rather than 
the few months that such situations have 
normally existed), highlights the resilience 
and creativity of movements which are 
grounded in the development of the “political 
economy of labour” – whether that labour is 
of a classic working-class occupying its own 
factory, of unemployed workers tackling 
distribution networks which exclude them, 
or of indigenous peasants defending and 
extending communal land-holding patterns. 
The distinction between dual-power 
situations and stalemate can be stated as 
follows: in a stalemate, the “movement from 
above” still rules but does so without 
consensus; in a dual-power situation, the 
“movement from above” no longer rules, at 
least over significant parts of society or of the 
national territory. Similarly, in a stalemate, 
the movement from below cannot yet 
articulate a strategy for moving forward; in a 
dual-power situation, ordinary people are 
refusing to allow themselves to be ruled as 
they have been ruled in the past, but the 
structures of power have not yet crumbled4. 
At the same time, we have to stress that 
these movements are only at the stage of 
dual-power institutions, entailing high costs 
to participants and dependent on extensive 
networks of international solidarity from 
                                       
4 This definition of Trotsky’s was drawn directly 
from the experience of the Russian and French 
revolutions… 
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movements abroad. Neither has successfully 
tackled the problem of state power locally, 
and activists from both movements make it 
clear that what they need most is to avoid 
isolation.  
 
Standing on the shoulders of giants 
We do not want to claim a theoretical 
position which would place us above the 
movement as experts who can see what 
participants do not. In our view, the 
movements in Chiapas and Argentina see 
about as far as can be seen at the present 
time, both in terms of their grounding in 
local struggles and in terms of their 
engagement with the wider “movement of 
movements”. While “one, two, three, many 
Chiapas” will not in the long run suffice as a 
strategy, for now it represents quite enough 
of a challenge for the movement in most of 
the rest of the world. Similarly, while the 
current development of movement struggles 
throughout Latin America is not yet enough 
to transform the basic facts of neo-liberalism 
- the power of transnational institutions and 
the US – it is undoubtedly a necessary next 
step. 
In reflecting on the specific role of parties 
and the state in contemporary Latin America, 
we suggest that governments such as the 
Chavez or Lula ones are best seen in this 
context, although they do not as yet 
constitute dual power situations. Whether 
the power of capital is represented primarily 
in opposition to the state (as in Venezuela) or 
embedded within it (as in Brazil), there is 
clearly something interesting going on – 
another aspect of the stalemate – but as yet 
it can hardly be said that either genuinely 
represents direct popular power working 
through alternative institutions.  
Nevertheless, within peripheral situations, 
the movement has reached a point where it 
can enable governments which would be 
unthinkable without its presence, and which 
enable it both locally and globally (e.g. the 
group of poorer nations which has been 
organised at recent WTO summits, from 
Cancun 2003 on). But it would be an 
exaggeration to say that the movement is “in 
power” in any simple sense in any Latin 
American country. 
This is why we feel it is crucial not to 
romanticise what we see elsewhere: because 
while the experiences of other activists have 
much of value to offer, they do not have all 
the answers, in part because we hold some of 
them in relation to our own movements. 
What other movements need is not so much 
our uncritical allegiance as our own 
development of comparable movements at 
home. 
We need to reflect in turn on the relationship 
between today’s forms of dual-power (and 
related phenomena) and those of previous 
generations; and to explore whether the 
different relationships between movement 
and state we can see in Latin America reflect 
fundamental theoretical / strategic 
differences or rather local peculiarities. 
At this point, therefore, we return to our own 
contexts and ask how some of the struggles 
we are most familiar with – the NBA, the 
Irish anti-capitalist movement – could 
develop to a comparable level. What would be 
involved in them doing so? And how can 
activists encourage this? How can the 
momentary anti-war mobilisations of 2003 
become a broader recognition of each other 
across the world? 
 
Beyond neo-liberalism? Possible outcomes 
of the movement 
At this point we should, if we can, offer some 
concrete proposals for getting beyond the 
stalemate and bringing the movement to a 
point where it can successfully confront the 
transnational state, transform capitalist 
relations at the point of production and 
create the dual-power institutions that are 
part and parcel of constructing another 
world.  
It is traditional to draw on Gramsci’s 
reflections at this point. We feel it is 
important first to move back a step and 
explore the situation that Gramsci was 
reflecting on: the movement wave of 1916-24, 
which led to the collapse of three empires, a 
nationalist revolution in Ireland, a 
democratic revolution in Germany and a 
socialist revolution in Russia. Gramsci, and 
his fellow-activists (such as Connolly, 
Luxemburg, Lukács, Trotsky and Lenin) were 
heavily involved in this movement wave and 
made significant contributions to movement 
theorising.  
Nevertheless the primary experience was one 
of the failure of revolutions and proto-
revolutionary situations, and Gramsci’s 
thinking about hegemony and the 
relationship between state and society takes 
place against this background of the rise of 
fascism, the increasingly desperate putschist 
strategies of the KPD in particular, and the 
need to think both in a longer term and on a 
broader basis about the problem of 
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revolution. We have been here before; though 
we can still hope not to arrive at the 
situation from which Gramsci was writing. 
In other words, rather than using Gramsci as 
a talisman against serious thinking about 
revolution, the point is that his political 
thought is entirely geared to the question of 
when and how revolution can become 
possible: not simply through a political 
process, but through the reorganisation of 
society from the bottom up. 
 
The nature of (counter-) hegemony 
A certain kind of reading of Gramsci uses the 
term “counter-hegemony” (which does not 
appear in the Prison Notebooks) to mean the 
multicoloured, but essentially separate 
resistance to currently dominant social 
forces. The notion of counter-hegemony 
would certainly be legitimate in terms of 
Gramsci’s thought, but rather in the sense of 
the construction of a different kind of 
hegemony: a radically democratic one, but 
nevertheless connected in a shared direction 
developed through solidarity, cooperation 
and communication.  
In other words, the issue is not simply the 
dismantling of existing relationships of 
direction and ideology, but (by definition) 
their replacement with new kinds of 
relationship, growing out of local rationalities 
and the “political economy of labour”. These 
need to work both at a practical (“directive”, 
says Gramsci) level locally, but also to be 
integrated together conceptually and 
communicatively with developments 
elsewhere. (Gramsci’s sketchy notes “On the 
Southern Question” – on how to link up the 
struggles of peripheral peasants and the 
urban working-class – are still relevant today 
in this context.)  
If we can achieve this – developing existing 
struggles and communicating together – we 
are in the process of “building another world 
within the shell of the old”, another world 
which is by definition in conflict with older 
forms of social relations. This does not in 
itself guarantee that the new world will win 
that conflict, but without this process it can 
be guaranteed that there will not even be a 
contest. To summarise our understanding in 
a phrase: we need to connect with other 
people’s struggles beyond those which are 
already connected in the movement, or we 
will fail. If we do this, we have a chance of 
success. 
 
What might happen in a revolution? 
We want to finish by addressing the question 
of whether revolution is still a meaningful 
concept today. “Revolution” can, after all, 
mean simply that popular struggle gives a 
push towards the next phase of capitalism 
(as has been the case with the three previous 
“world-revolutionary moments” of 1916 – 23, 
1943 – 45 and 1965-70), or the building of 
another world, however patchily. This in turn 
raises the question of whether it consists of 
the construction of a single new world or of 
many interlinked worlds.  
This raises some core conceptual issues 
about the relationship between state and 
society as it is problematised in revolution: 
that revolutions entail society rising up and 
overthrowing the state, yet this is necessary 
in part because of the role of the state in 
fixing key social relations such as power and 
ownership. Another way of putting this is to 
ask what has to be the case in order for 
people to be able to develop freely. 
In this sense, rather than the most radical 
theoretical position on offer, it might be 
useful to consider socialist feminism (for 
example) as something of a minimal 
programme: if we can arrive at a point where 
everybody has access to the means of 
producing a reasonable living without 
destroying the planet, where nobody is 
subject to arbitrary power relationships at 
home or in the workplace, where rape, 
torture and slavery are things of the past – 
then we can get on with the real business of 
living, and leave the “prehistory of humanity” 
behind us with a sigh of relief.  
 
Moments of confrontation 
It cannot be expected, however, that the 
global capitalist class, the transnational 
state, patriarchal masculinities or 
institutional racism will simply apologise for 
their past misdemeanours and disappear. In 
thinking towards the nature of the moments 
of confrontation that lie ahead, a key feature 
to consider is that of uncertainty: in the 
nature of things, movements from above will 
try to intervene at a point when the success 
of movements from below is not yet 
guaranteed. This presents activists in 
movements from below with a choice 
between taking a risk on a confrontation 
(“hanging together”) where the costs of defeat 
are massive and widespread, or pulling back 
and taking individual consequences 
(“hanging separately”). What is the best way 
to judge such situations? 
 9
In the process of unmaking states, both 
positive and negative lessons can be learned 
from “1989”. Positively, it is clear that states 
cannot simply rule “out of the barrel of a 
gun”: since the cost of failed attempts at 
military repression is inevitably high for the 
rulers (Ceaucescu), it is crucial for 
movements from below to try to create 
situations where states are unlikely to be 
able to use military force successfully 
(Honecker) and to avoid the possibility of 
“Tiananmen” situations (which in turn 
entails exploring the conditions for those)5. 
This strategy fits with our broader argument 
for developing local rationalities from below, 
in effect undermining the top-down control 
structures of the police and military with 
alternative logics and the development of new 
kinds of legitimacy from below. The wider 
process within which these “insurrectional” 
questions are embedded, then, is that of the 
development of new kinds of everyday 
practice, grounded in new kinds of 
institutions developed from below – a 
practice which in turn gives rise to new 
forms of constitutionality and legitimacy, 
however understood (not necessarily in state-
like terms).  
 
Four possible outcomes 
The possible outcomes of the process we are 
charting, and arguing for, are many, but we 
conclude by isolating four possibilities, and 
relating them to current activist perspectives 
on what needs to be done. 
In one, “Fourth World War”, low-intensity 
counter-insurgency becomes a way of life for 
“dissident zones”, based on their isolation 
from more powerful, and essentially 
conservative areas. This connects to 
movement strategies of self-ghettoisation, the 
romanticisation of protest as such, and 
radicalism as style or moralism.  
In a second, “Ebbing Tide”, a strategic or 
dramatic defeat such as that of Prague or 
Paris in 1968 leads the way for the isolation 
of key activists, the retreat of ordinary 
participants – but also a “composting” of this 
                                       
5 These are more specialised than might appear, 
given that the PLA is a conscript army. They 
included the use of the last leading military 
survivor of the Long March, the selection of a unit 
from a rural area far away from the main centres 
of unrest, and the isolation of that unit in 
barracks for a lengthy period prior to the 
suppression of the insurrection. Tiananmen was 
not inevitable, in other words. 
experience and resentment in a flow of local 
struggles such as characterised most of 
western Europe in the 1970s. This connects 
to “organisational patriotism”, the egoism of 
a single-project focus and the more general 
phenomenon of particularist “free riders” on 
a general movement. 
In a third, “Settling for Less”, movement 
elites are coopted with the offer of formal 
victories (restructuring of international 
financial institutions, for example) masking a 
more substantial informal defeat (for example 
within workplaces and communities). This 
connects to NGO strategies within the 
movement. Characteristic of all three of these 
options is a failure of movement 
participation: geographical isolation in 
“Fourth World War”, demobilisation and 
institutional fragmentation of participants in 
“Ebbing Tide”, and lack of democratic control 
in “Settling for Less”.  
Our fourth and most hopeful option, 
“Constructing Another World”, represents by 
constrast a situation where the movement 
has been successful at broadening 
participation geographically and socially, 
deepening its engagement with everyday 
struggles and in building strong forms of 
counter-hegemony.  
At this point, though moments of 
confrontation will certainly be part of the 
story, interest shifts to processes of 
“transition”: how workers in multinational 
corporations might restructure their 
activities, for example; how thoroughly 
globalised communities might develop 
adequate structures for self-government; how 
financial capitalism might be dismantled 
without a global recession; and so on.  
Readers will perhaps be relieved that we do 
not attempt to offer any recipes for this 
transition, except to express our confidence 
that “humanity never sets itself problems 
which it is not capable of solving”…  
 
Alf Gunvald Nilsen: alf.nilsen@sos.uib.no 
Laurence Cox: laurence.cox@nuim.ie 
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